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Legal Technique in the Creation of a
New International Reserve Asset:
Special Drawing Rights and the
Amendment of the Articles of
Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund
Joseph Gold*
N MAY 31, 1968, the Board of Governors of the International
Monetary Fund approved a Proposed Amendment of the
Fund's Articles of Agreement, and member states have been asked
whether they accept the proposal. The Amendment will enter into
force when the Fund informs
members that the proposal has
THE AUTHOR: JOSEPH GoLD (LL.B., been accepted by three-fifths of
LL.M., London University; S.J.D., Har-.
yard University) is General Counsel and the members, i.e., 67 of the
Director of the Legal Department of the present 111 members, having
International Monetary Fund. four-fifths of the totalvoting
power.' The Amendment will
be the first in the history of the Fund, but it will represent the most
important advance in the development of international monetary
law and the organization of the international monetary system since
the creation of the Fund itself. This article deals with certain fea-
tures of the legal technique that has been adopted in order to
achieve .this advance.
I. THE ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The Articles were drafted at the Bretton Woods Conference in
July 1944, and they entered into force on December 27, 1945, at
which date, therefore, the Fund came into existence as an interna-
tional organization. The original Articles consisted of an Introduc-
tory Article, 20 Articles (I to XX), and five Schedules (A to E).
The opinions expressed in this article are to be attributed to the author and not
necessarily to the International Monetary Fund.
1 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, Art.
XVII, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501 (1946) [hereinafter cited by specific Article].
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The purposes of the Fund were set forth in Article I, and they refer
to the promotion of international monetary cooperation, the expan-
sion and balanced growth of international trade as a contribution to
such primary objectives of economic policy as high levels of employ-
ment and development, the promotion of exchange stability, the
maintenance of orderly exchange arrangements, the avoidance of
competitive exchange depreciation, the establishment of a multi-
lateral system of payments in respect of current transactions, the
mitigation of disequilibrium in balances of payments, and the pro-
vision of resources to assist members to correct balance of payments
maladjustments without resorting to measures destructive of nation-
al or international prosperity. These purposes are extrapolated in
provisions that establish a code of legal obligations for members
that still constitutes the heart of the international monetary system
and the law by which it is governed. The code includes obligations
for members with respect to the establishment of par values for their
currencies, directly or indirectly in terms of gold, the rates at which
they may permit exchange transactions to be conducted, the prices
at which they may buy and sell gold, the harmful exchange practices
they must avoid, and the convertibility that they must establish and
observe for their currencies, but even this impressive list is not ex-
haustive.
To assist members to follow policies that are consistent with the
purposes of the Fund and enable members to perform their obliga-
tions, other provisions in the Articles establish a pool of resources
from which members can temporarily augment their reserves. Nor-
mally, a member will prevent the depreciation or appreciation of its
currency and perform its exchange rate obligations under the Ar-
ticles by making foreign exchange available to the market or by
acquiring foreign exchange from the market. For this purpose, the
monetary authorities of a member hold reserves of foreign ex-
change, most often the United States dollar as the main currency for
market intervention, or of gold, with which they can get that cur-
rency. If a member feels that its reserves are inadequate to enable
it to deal with its international payments difficulties, it can purchase
foreign exchange from the Fund in return for its own currency and
in this way gain the time in which to pursue policies that will over-
come its difficulties, restore its reserves, and enable it to reverse the
transaction with the Fund within a period that does not exceed 3
to 5 years.
The Fund's pool of resources consists of gold and the currencies
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of all members. These resources are derived in the main from the
subscriptions of members. Each member has a quota, which deter-
mines many of its privileges and duties in the Fund, including the
subscription it must make to the Fund. A member's subscription is
paid partly in gold and partly in its own currency. At the moment,
the net resources owned by the Fund amount to the equivalent of
approximately 21 billion United States dollars. The basic transac-
tion of the Fund is the one already described, the sale to a member
of the currencies of other members, but the Fund also engages in
other financial operations and transactions that are connected with
this basic transaction. For example, it may replenish its currency
holdings by selling gold or by borrowing, it requires members to re-
purchase their own currencies from the Fund for gold or the cur-
rencies of other members in order to reverse purchases of exchange
from the Fund, and it levies charges.
II. THE NEED FOR A NEW RESERVE ASSET
In recent years there developed the conviction that a new reserve
asset would be needed, in addition to gold and reserve currencies, in
order to strengthen the international monetary system. This con-
viction was based on the thesis that an increasing total of world
reserves was necessary as an assurance of growth in national and
international economic activity. Monetary authorities feel that they
must have adequate resources at their command in order to pursue
policies that are consistent with the Articles and other liberal objec-
tives, and if monetary authorities lack this confidence in the size of
the reserves that are unconditionally available to them, they may be
tempted to pursue restrictive and retrogressive policies in order to
conserve their reserves or enlarge them at the expense of other
countries. The experience of recent years did not justify the belief
that there would be a growth in world reserves sufficient to combat
the bias towards deflation. The deficits in the balance of payments
of the United States over a long period had made the major contri-
bution to the increase in the reserves of other countries, but the defi-
cit had persisted to the point at which some countries had become
reluctant to add more dollars to their reserves. The conversion of
dollars for gold by some of these countries diminished the gold
stock of the United States and contracted the total of world reserves.
At the same time, it was realized that if the United States curbed
or eliminated its deficit in conformity with the general view that this
was necessary in order to preserve confidence in the international
1969]
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monetary system, the major source of the increment to world re-
serves would be largely or wholly dammed.
The forecast for the contribution of newly produced gold to
world reserves was equally unpromising. For some time, much of
the new production of gold had been devoted to the arts and sci-
ences, and another substantial proportion had gone to satisfy the de-
mands of the private hoarders of and speculators in gold. Indeed,
there had been times at which no new gold entered reserves, and
gold already in reserves was drained away to meet demand in the
gold markets.
The quotas of members in the Fund can be and have been en-
larged, both individually and generally, but this was not the solution
of the reserve dilemma. Members wanted the assurance of an ex-
panding volume of unconditional liquidity, which means reserves
that can be used without an examination of policies or the require-
ment of undertakings with respect to them. The liquidity that the
Fund provides by the sale of exchange to members is largely condi-
tional. The Fund applies policies that are graduated in severity ac-
cording to the cumulative outstanding use that members seek to
make of the Fund's resources.
III. THE NEW SUPPLEMENT TO RESERVES
International debate became more intense as the reserve dilemma
became more obvious, but the search for an acceptable solution was
lengthy. For some 5 years discussion and then negotiation were
conducted in two main arenas. One of these was the Fund and the
other was the group of ten members that have joined (either directly
or through their central banks) in the General Arrangements to Bor-
row, a decision of the Fund under which, by adhering, the partici-
pants have expressed their willingness to lend their currencies to the
Fund to supplement its resources for certain of its exchange transac-
tions.2 The process of discussion and negotiation, which at one
stage involved joint sessions of the Fund's Executive Directors and
the Deputies of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
of the group of ten, led to the endorsement by the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Fund of an "Outline of a Facility Based on Special
Drawing Rights in the Fund."' 3 At its annual meeting at Rio de
,
2 IMF, SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 55-56 (Third Issue, Washington, D.C., 1965) [hereinafter cited as SE-
LECTED DECISIONS].
3 See Gold, The Next Stage in the Development of International Monetary Law: The
Deliberate Control of Liquidity, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 397-402 (1968).
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Janeiro in September 1967, the Board of Governors adopted a Reso-
lution requesting the Executive Directors to proceed with their work
on the establishment of the facility in the Fund on the basis of the
Outline, as well as on improvements in the rules and practices of
the Fund that were suggested by international developments and the
practice of the Fund, and to report by March 31, 1968, proposing
the amendments that would be necessary for both purposes. The
completed report proposed the Amendment, consisting of many del
tailed changes in, or additions to, the provisions of the Articles, that
is now before members for their acceptance.4 The Proposed Amend-
ment includes amendments that will establish the facility and also
introduce certain improvements in the original provisions,, but that
proposal can be accepted only as a whole and without modification.
The Amendment will establish two separate Accounts in the
Fund, the General Account and the Special Drawing Account. They
are really departments of a single entity, but the word has not been
used because it already applies to the "departments" into which the
Fund staff is organized. The two Accounts do not enjoy legal per-
sonality of their own. The Fund itself is the only international per-
son, and it will be the same person as existed before the effective
date of the Amendment. All of the original operations and transac-
tions of the Fund will be conducted by the Fund through the Gen-
eral Account, and all operations and transactions in special drawing
rights will be conducted through the Special Drawing Account.
However, the General Account will be able to receive, hold, and use
special drawing rights in or as the result of some operations and
transactions, and those operations and transactions will be conducted
by the Fund through both Accounts. Nevertheless, the two Ac-
counts will be separate in the sense that any assets or property held
in one Account cannot be reached to discharge or meet the liabilities,
obligations, or losses of the Fund incurred in conducting its opera-
.tions and transactions through the other Account. This will not
prevent the Fund from meeting the expenses of conducting the busi-
ness of the Special Drawing Account with the resources of the Gen-
eral Account, but reimbursement will be required. The two
Accounts are also insulated from each other for the purpose of set-
tlement agreements between the Fund and a withdrawing member
4 IMF, ESTABLISHMENT OF A FACILITY BASED ON SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND MODIFICATIONS IN THE RULES AND
PRACTICES OF THE FUND, REPORT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS TO THE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS PROPOSING AMENDMENT OF THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT (Washing-
ton, D.C., Apr. 1968).
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or a member that terminates its participation in the Special Drawing
Account and for the purpose of the liquidation of the Accounts.
Membership in the Fund necessarily means involvement in the
General Account, but each member has an option, but is not ob-
ligated, to participate in the Special Drawing Account, which is, of
course, the "facility" referred to in the Outline approved at Rio de
Janeiro. The Special Drawing Account cannot begin its activities
until instruments of participation have been deposited by members
that have at least 75 percent of the total quotas in the Fund. Once
the Special Drawing Account becomes operative, it will be possible
for the Fund to make periodic allocations to all participants, in pro-
portion to their quotas, of "special drawing rights," which partici-
pants will be able to include in their reserves. The Fund will be
able to allocate special drawing rights in order to meet the long-
term global need to supplement existing reserve assets if and when
the need should arise. Similarly, the Fund will be able to cancel
special drawing rights that have been issued if there should be an
excessive supply of reserves in the world, although the prospect of
this is not very likely. By the exercise of these new powers, the
Fund will be able to help avoid economic stagnation and deflation
as well as excess demand and inflation in the world. This will be
the first time that the international community will be able to affect
the volume of liquidity by rational decisions taken in accordance
with law instead of leaving it to be determined by such uncoordi-
nated and irrational forces as the deficits in the balances of pay-
ments of the reserve currency countries, the volume of gold produc-
tion and the pattern of its absorption, and the conversion of reserve
currencies into gold.
Special drawing rights have been given qualities that will enable
each participant to decide to include them in its reserves together
with such traditional assets as gold and reserve currencies. The cen-
tral quality of special drawing rights is that a participant is entitled
to use them to obtain currency convertible in fact from a participant
that the Fund must designate. The transferor is expected to use its
special drawing rights in this way only to meet balance of payments
needs or because of unfavorable developments in its other reserves,
but transfers are not contingent upon any examination by the Fund
of the transferor's position or on any undertakings by the transferor
with respect to its policies. A transfer does not decrease the reserves
of either party: the transferor parts with special drawing rights but
receives foreign exchange with which it can defend its own cur-
[Vol. 1: 105
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rency, while the transferee parts with currency but receives special
drawing rights that it will be able to include in its reserves and use
when the need arises. The flow of special drawing rights back and
forth does not diminish the stock of world reserves.
IV. DECISIONS ON SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS
Decisions in the Fund are taken by the Board of Governors, in
which all powers of the Fund are vested, or by the Executive Direc-
tors, to whom all powers can be delegated except those that are re-
served to the Board of Governors. The Board consists of one
governor and one alternate, appointed by each member. A gover-
nor, or his alternate in the governor's absence, casts the number of
votes allotted to the member appointing him. The Executive Direc-
tors, to whom all but the reserved powers have been delegated, con-
sist at present of 20 executive directors of whom some are appointed
by individual members and the rest elected by groups of the remain-
ing members. Each executive director, or his alternate in his ab-
sence, casts the number of votes allotted to the member appointing
him or the votes allotted to the members whose votes counted to-
wards his election. All of the votes that a governor or executive
director is entitled to cast can be cast only as a unit. Each member
has 250 votes plus one additional vote for each part of its quota
equivalent to $100,000, so that there are very wide variations in
voting strength, because quotas range at present from $3 million to
$5.16 billion.
Separate organs have not been created for the two Accounts.
Decisions will be taken in conducting the business of each Account
by the same Board of Governors and Executive Directors. Simi-
larly, the Managing Director and staff of the Fund will serve in
that capacity for both Accounts. Nevertheless, there will be a dif-
ference, which could be radical, in connection with voting on deci-
sions if the participants in the Special Drawing Account do not
include all members of the Fund. In making decisions that per-
tain to the General Account, all governors and all executive direc-
tors will be entitled to vote in the Board of Governors or the Execu-
tive Directors respectively. All governors and executive directors
will be able to attend meetings of their organ at which matters
pertaining exclusively to the Special Drawing Account are on the
agenda and will be able to join in the discussion. However, only
governors appointed by participants will be entitled to vote on these
matters in the Board of Governors. In the Executive Directors, only
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executive directors appointed or elected by at least one member
that is a participant will be entitled to vote. Such an executive
director will be entitled to cast, as a unit, the number of votes
allotted to the member which is the participant that appointed him
or allotted to the members that are participants whose votes counted
towards his election. It follows that some governors or executive
directors might have no votes to cast. Similarly, these governors
and executive directors would not be able to join in calling meetings
or have their presence taken into account in determining whether a
quorum is present for the discussion of items pertaining exclusively
to special drawing rights.
It is obvious that a logical impasse must be avoided in determin-
ing whether a matter pertains exclusively to the Special Drawing
Account. It is provided, therefore, that this question shall be de-
cided as if it pertained exclusively to the General Account, which
means that all governors or executive directors will be entitled to
vote. It is possible, of course, that some matters may relate to both
Accounts, and on these matters two decisions will have to be taken,
one by the vote of all governors or executive directors and the
other by the vote of only those entitled to vote in matters pertaining
exclusively to the Special Drawing Account.
V. FORM OF AMENDMENT
In the studies of the creation of a new reserve asset, four legal
techniques were considered. The first was some development in
the Fund's policies and practicies that would not require amend-
ment of its Articles. 5 The advantage of this technique was the
very fact that it did not bring into play the complicated procedure
of amendment. The disadvantage was that it restricted the flexibil-
ity that could be employed in finding a solution to what was pos-
sible under the original Articles. The desire for greater flexibility
triumphed over the traditional and understandable reluctance to
resort to amendment. A second technique was an agreement be-
tween the Fund and members under which the Fund could have
administered a scheme for the benefit of the other contracting
parties.6 This technique ceased to be a possibility once it became
5 IMF ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1966 at 19. See also REPORT OF THE STUDY
GROUP ON THE CREATION OF RESERVE ASSETS, REPORT TO THE DEPUTIES OF THE
GROUP OF TEN 62-63 (May 31, 1965) [hereinafter cited as OSSOLA REPORT].
6 Cf. Social Progress Trust Fund Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Inter-American Development Bank, June 19, 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 4763 (1961).
See also Advisory Opinion Concerning the Interpretation of Article 3, paragraph 2 of
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understood that any new reserve asset would be made available to
all members. The effective choice, therefore, was narrowed down
to the amendment of the Articles and the creation of a new inter-
national institution as an affiliate of the Fund.
The special drawing rights facility is to be established in the
Fund by an amendment of its Articles which takes the form, sub-
stantially, of the addition of 12 Articles (XXI to XXXII) and four
Schedules (F to I) to the original Articles. The Introductory
Article is changed from the simple statement that the Fund was
established and would operate in accordance with the provisions
that followed to a more elaborate provision which refers to the
fact that the Articles include original provisions and those adopted
to establish the facility and effect certain changes, that there are two
Accounts, that members have an option to participate in the Spe-
cial Drawing Account, and that operations and transactions will be
conducted through the General Account except that those involving
special drawing rights will be conducted through the Special Draw-
ing Account.
Article XX of the original Articles was entitled "Final Provi-
sions" because it was the last Article in the original charter, but
under the Amendment it was to be succeeded by 12 more Articles.
Although Article XX dealt with somewhat miscellaneous topics
(such as signature and entry into force of the Articles, initial or-
ganizational arrangements, the initial determination of par values,
and the commencement of exchange transactions), they all related
to the period before or soon after the Fund came into being or to
certain initial events. It was possible, therefore, to change the
title from "Final Provisions" to "Inaugural Provisions."
The establishment of the facility by means of the Proposed
Amendment in the form that has been described created surprisingly
few technical problems. It proved to be unnecessary to mention
special drawing rights anywhere in Articles I to XX or in any of
the original Schedules. In fact, it was thought desirable to avoid
these references for reasons that are discussed below. The change
required only minor amendments in the original provisions, 7 and
these related to two provisions in which gold and convertible cur-
rencies were referred to as the components of members' monetary
the Treaty of Lausanne, (1925] P.C.I.J. REPORTS, set. B, No. 12, at 27-28, 30, 31; and
OSSOLA REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
7 This refers only to the consequences of the facility and not to those amendments
that are being made as improvements in the original provisions.
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reserves.8 Under the provisions dealing with special drawing rights,
members' monetary reserves will include their holdings of special
drawing rights as well.' Therefore, the references to gold and con-
vertible currencies in two provisions were amended to read "each
type of monetary reserve" in one provision and somewhat similar
language in the other provision.
It must not be assumed, because only the new provisions refer
specifically to special drawing rights, that the original provisions
have no impact on special drawing rights. The effects of the
original provisions will be diverse. Some of them will apply to the
exercise by the Fund of functions that do not involve the conduct of
operations and transactions through either the General Account or
the Special Drawing Account. Article II dealing with the adjust-
ment of quotas and Article XVII dealing with amendment of the
Articles are examples of this category of provisions. It is apparent,
however, that actions taken under these provisions may affect
special drawing rights. Another category of provisions will apply
solely to the conduct by the Fund of operations and transactions
through the General Account, but even so they may affect special
drawing rights because these provisions determine indirectly the
operations and transactions in special drawing rights in which the
Fund may engage through the General Account by dealing in spe-
cial drawing rights instead of gold or currency.' These are only a
few examples of the interrelationships between the original provi-
sions and the new special drawing rights. The interrelationships
are too complex to be compressed into one simple formula.
It would not have been impossible to adopt a radically differ-
ent technique in amending the Articles. It would have been pos-
sible to integrate the original provisions and the new provisions
dealing with special drawing rights. Certain provisions could ob-
viously have been integrated. For example, a new immunity with
respect to special drawing rights" could have been included in the
original provisions dealing with the privileges and immunities of
the Fund;' 2 new definitions affecting special drawing rights S could
have been included in the provision setting forth the explanation of
8 Art. V, § 7(b); and Sched. B, 5 1.
9 Art. XXV, § 7(a).
10 Art. XXV, § 7(b)-(f).
"Art. XXVII(b).
12 Art. IX.
13 Art. XXXII.
[Vol. 1: 105
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
terms in the original Articles; 14 and the provisions dealing with de-
cisions on matters pertaining to special drawing rights' 5 could have
been incorporated in the original Article that dealt with organiza-
tion and management.'6 Integration might possibly have been car-
ried much further, but no drafts of this character were prepared, so
that it cannot be said how the Articles would have looked if this
approach had been followed.
Once it was decided not to attempt an integration of the two
sets of provisions, the segregation of those dealing specifically with
special drawing rights was rigorously observed. It was felt that
there should be no integration even when, as in the examples in the
preceding paragraph, integration would have been technically easy
to achieve and would have been clearly justified because of the con-
tent of the provisions. This policy was pursued because of the diffi-
culty of determining the point at which partial integration would
stop, and this difficulty might have led to the complete overhaul
of the original Articles. This could have been an arduous and
lengthy task that would have required more time than was available
under the Resolution of the Board of Governors. It must not be
assumed, however, that segregation was a pis aller. The decision to
adopt this technique was reinforced by the widespread conviction
that it had two major advantages. The first was that it involved
only microscopic changes in the original Articles, with which mem-
bers had become familiar in the more than 22 years of the Fund's
existence. It is true that a certain number of changes were being
made as improvements in the Fund, but this did not lead anyone to
believe that amendments should be made for some less compelling
reason. The second advantage was the reverse of the first: the pro-
visions dealing with special drawing rights were new, and it was
thought that members could familiarize themselves with the novel
provisions more readily if they were collected into what would be,
in effect, an identifiable chapter of the Articles.
VI. AMENDMENT VS. AFFILIATE
A more fundamental question of technique was not how the
Articles should be amended in order to establish the facility but
whether that should be done by amendment at all. It has been
14 Art. XIX.
15 Art. XXVII(a).
16 Art. XII.
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said already that the only alternative to amendment that was con-
sidered at all seriously was the creation of a new international or-
ganization as an affiliate of the Fund. There is no legal definition
of an "affiliate" in international law and organization. The word
implies a close connection with another and presumably dominant
organization, but there are various ways in which that relationship
can be arranged. The alternative of an affiliate was much in the
minds of those who were working on the creation of a new reserve
asset because the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment, the Fund's sister institution, has twice chosen the tech-
nique of an affiliate in drafting legal instruments for the perform-
ance of new tasks. Moreover, certain organizational features of
the two affiliates have been found appropriate for the special draw-
ing rights facility.
The first of the two affiliates, the International Finance Cor-
poration (IFC), came into being on July 20, 1956, in order to sup-
plement the activities of the Bank by collaborating with private
investors in promoting private enterprise, without governmental
guarantees, when that would contribute to development in circum-
stances in which sufficient private capital was not available on rea-
sonable terms. IFC is an entity separate from the Bank, with a
legal personality of its own. Its funds are kept separate and apart
from those of the Bank, and neither institution is liable for the acts
or obligations of the other.
Membership in IFC is open to members of the Bank. The
Governors and Alternate Governors of the Bank are ex officio
Governors and Alternate Governors of IFC if the appointing coun-
try is a member of both institutions. An Executive Director of the
Bank is ex officio a Director of IFC if he was appointed by a
country that is a member of both institutions or if he was elected in
an election in which the votes of at least one member of the Bank
which is also a member of IFC counted towards his election. A
Director of IFC who is an appointed Executive Director of the Bank
is entitled to cast the number of votes that the member that ap-
pointed him is entitled to cast in IFC. A Director of IFC who is an
elected Executive Director of the Bank is entitled to cast the number
of votes which the members of IFC whose votes counted towards
his election in the Bank are entitled to cast in IFC. The President
of the Bank is ex officio the Chairman of the Board of Directors of
IFC. The President of IFC, who acts under the direction of the
Board of Directors and the general supervision of the Chairman, is
[Vol. 1: 105
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appointed by the Board of Directors on the Chairman's recommen-
dation.
The International Development Association (IDA), the second
of the two affiliates, came into being on September 24, 1960, in
order to provide financing to meet the developmental requirements
of members on terms that are more flexible and bear less heavily on
the balance of payments than those of conventional loans. IDA
also is intended to supplement the activities of the Bank. The
legal structure of IDA and its relationship with the Bank strongly
resemble those of IFC. There are certain differences, however, that
are designed to create a closer relationship of IDA with the Bank.
For example, whereas the President of IFC acts under the supervi-
sion of the Chairman, the President of IDA is also its Chairman.
Therefore, the President of the Bank, who has the office of Chair-
man in IFC, has both offices in IDA. 7 There are also somewhat
closer legal ties between IDA and the Bank than between IFC and
the Bank in connection with the Chairman of the Board of Gover-
nors and the staff. Generally, the closer relationship in the case of
IDA is attributable to the greater similarity of its task to that of the
Bank.
Enough has been said of the legal structures of IFC and IDA to
show their resemblance to the special drawing rights facility, but
further parallels could be cited. Why, then, were the two prece-
dents not followed? The Fund's Annual Reports for 196518 and
196619 refer to the creation of a new institution as one course that
might be followed, and the Report for 1967 shows that this was
contemplated as late as July 1967 when it spoke of "a scheme for
deliberate reserve creation in the form of drawing rights which
would be operated in, or in close association with, the Fund. ' 20 Be-
tween July and September 1967, the choice was made, so that the
Outline could declare unequivocally that the facility "is to be estab-
lished within the framework of the Fund and, therefore, by an
Amendment of the Fund's Articles." Although the problem arose
many times before it was settled by the Outline, there was no sys-
tematic or sustained discussion of it in the Fund, in the group of
ten, or in the joint sessions. It was resolved by a general and
largely tacit understanding that amendment was to be preferred. It
17 In practice, the President of the Bank has been the President of all three organiza-
tions.
18 IMF ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1965 at 18.
19 IMF ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1966 at 19.
2o IMF ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1967 at 10.
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follows that the records of the long debates do not include any
agreed reasons why the choice was made, and there may have been
diverse reasons in the minds of those who participated in the de-
bates.
VII. THE CHOICE OF AMENDMENT
The choice in favor of amendment and against an affiliate was
not made because it was the more effective technique for the crea-
tion of a new reserve asset. It was realized at an early stage that the
substance of the scheme that was being discussed could be given
effect by either technique. At least eight reasons may be suggested
for the decision to amend the Articles and reject an affiliate.
(1) It is apt to begin by recalling the wisdom of William of
Ockham: entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. There
was no disposition to create another international organization un-
less there was a balance of legal, economic, or political advantage
in favor of it, and this could not be demonstrated."
(2) One of the most fundamental and most difficult issues
that had to be settled was the nature of the new resource. At one
extreme was the view that the characteristics of the new resource
should leave not the slightest doubt that it was a reserve asset that
members could use as freely as they could use the gold or currencies
in their reserves. This view was often expressed in the proposal
that the new reserve asset should be a "unit." At the other extreme
was the view that safeguards and limitations were necessary, for
example in order to avoid the danger that the issuance of the new
resource would encourage the prolongation of balance of payments
deficits. This view favored a solution that could be subsumed un-
der the heading of "credit." Its supporters looked with approval
to the Fund and the purchases of exchange from it that had to be
reversed within a moderate period.
After prolonged and intense debate, it was agreed that the prob-
lem should be solved not by agreeing on an a priori concept but by
agreeing on the individual characteristics with which the new re-
source should be endowed. The result was a compromise, although
one in which the agreed characteristics still gave the new resource
the quality of a reserve asset if members wished to regard it in that
way.
Terminology did not cease to be important and it was part of
21 Cf. Hearings on S. Res. 264 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at 54 (1958).
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the compromise. The new supplements to reserve assets are called
"special drawing rights" in deference to the view that they should
resemble credit. This does not mean that a use of them gives rise
to an obligation to reverse that use such as there is in the case of
purchases from the General Account. There is, however, an obliga-
tion on a participant to "reconstitute" its holdings of special draw-
ing rights so that it maintains over time an average balance of 30
percent of the allocations that it has received, but even this limited
obligation may be altered or abrogated without the need to amend
the Articles. Even though the reconstitution obligation is related
only distantly to the obligation to reverse purchases from the Gen-
eral Account, the term "special drawing rights" was helpful in re-
solving difficulties because it carried a certain connotation of those
transactions of the General Account. The language of the original
Articles consistently refers to the transactions in terms of purchase
and sale, and the words "drawings" or "drawing rights" are never
employed. Nevertheless, these terms, although not terms of art,
have become established as operating parlance, perhaps because
they imply that there are limits on the amounts of exchange that a
member can purchase from the Fund. To convey the idea that
transactions in the new rights were in the same family as the trans-
actions of the General Account, it was decided to employ, and for
the first time give legal recognition to, the term "drawing rights."
To distinguish them from the old drawing rights, however, and to
emphasize that they were new and different, it was decided to call
them "special drawing rights." This compromise involved the al-
most inevitable implication that special drawing rights should co-
exist with the original drawing rights in the same institution under
an amended charter that would permit coexistence.
(3) The purposes of the Fund are set out in Article I. The
purposes are impressive in their breadth, and no change in them has
been found necessary in order to accommodate the new facility.
The Fund is instructed to take its decisions on the allocation and
cancellation of special drawing rights "in such manner as will pro-
mote the attainment of its purposes.' '22 If the allocation and can-
cellation of special drawing rights were to be governed by the pur-
poses of the Fund, the natural place for the facility through which
they would be allocated or cancelled was the Fund and not some
other international organization which, if created, would have pur-
poses that presumably overlapped those of the Fund.
22 Art. XXIV, § 1(a).
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(4) It is not impossible for an international organization to
operate with two sets of resources that are kept distinct and used
for different objectives. The Fund for Special Operations estab-
lished in the Inter-American Development Bank is an example of
resources held by an institution that are segregated from its other
resources. Therefore, if it had been decided that special drawing
rights should be backed by special resources, it would have been pos-
sible to place those resources in the Fund and keep them separate
from the resources held in the General Account. If there are to be
separate resources for a new international activity, it is at least argu-
able, however, that they should be placed in a new international
organization. This has been the experience with IFC and IDA,
which have resources of their own.
One of the most interesting features of the new facility is that
special drawing rights are not backed by any resources of gold or
currency held by the Fund. The participating members which re-
ceive allocations of special drawing rights do not deposit any coun-
terpart in the Special Drawing Account. On a transfer of special
drawing rights, the quid pro quo for them will be provided to the
transferor by the transferee and not by the Special Drawing Ac-
count. The only time that the Account will hold resources, and
then briefly, will be when it is helping to carry out the terms of a
settlement agreement with a country that terminates its participa-
tion in the Special Drawing Account or when it is carrying out the
liquidation of the facility. It follows that in practice the Account
may never hold resources. Special drawing rights are wholly fiduci-
ary. They are backed not by resources of gold and currency but by
the legal obligations of participants to receive them in return for
currency and to provide the necessary means of settlement on the
termination of a country's participation or on the liquidation of the
facility. This sophisticated system made it unnecessary to decide
that the facility should take the form of an affiliate for the purpose
of keeping its resources distinct from those of the Fund.
(5) Most of the liquidity that the Fund provides through the
General Account is conditional liquidity. The Fund can increase
and has increased the volume of conditional liquidity which it can
supply by increasing the quotas of members. The world needs both
conditional and unconditional liquidity, and although no precise
optimum relationship between them has been demonstrated so far,
it is apprehended that there may be such a relationship. In any
event, it is unlikely that anyone would disagree that the need for
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both kinds will grow over time. With this in mind, the Executive
Directors expressed the following opinion in the Fund's 1965 An-
nual Report:
It can reasonably be argued that a matter which is of concern to all
countries should be handled in an institution that has been organ-
ized as an instrument of financial cooperation on a world-wide
basis. This would, moreover, be one way of ensuring coordination
between the function of providing individual countries with short-
to-medium term balance of payments assistance on a conditional
basis and any new function of influencing the aggregate supply of
world reserves or unconditional liquidity. 23
This view prevailed, and although once again it would have
been possible to ensure the coordination to which it referred through
an affiliate, the more obvious technique for giving expression to it
was one that provided for coordination through a single institution.
The extent to which the idea of coordination has been accepted can
be seen in the new provisions dealing with the basic periods for
which the Fund takes decisions on the allocation or cancellation of
special drawing rights. These periods are 5 years in duration."4
This is the same length of time within which the Fund must make
a review of the quotas of all members in order to propose an adjust-
ment of them if it deems such a proposal appropriate.2 5  Although
there is no requirement that decisions on the allocation or cancella-
tion of special drawing rights be taken at the same time as decisions
on the general adjustment of quotas, the drafters of the new pro-
visions intended to make it possible for the Fund to arrive at these
decisions contemporaneously.
(6) A number of important features of the facility have been
derived from the experience of the Fund in its original operations
and transactions, and this experience is a continuing process. For
example, the Fund has developed, and continues to adapt, a policy,
based on economic and financial considerations, that indicates to
members the currencies which are appropriate for them to request
when making purchases from the Fund.26  This policy has influ-
enced the general principles incorporated in the Amendment by
which the Fund will designate the appropriate transferees of special
drawing rights when a participant wishes to transfer them, and the
Fund is empowered to supplement these principles from time to
23 IMF ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1965 at 18.
24 Art. XXIV, § 2(a).
25 Art. III, § 2.
26 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 33-39.
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time." There would be no likelihood of greater harmony in the
future between the policy on the selection of currencies for sale by
the Fund through the General Account and the principles for the
designation of transferees of special drawing rights if the function
of ensuring harmony were given to two institutions.
(7) At one stage in the debate that led to the facility the view
was advanced by some that, whatever the full plan that emerged
for taking care of the liquidity needs of the world, one part of it
should consist of the creation of reserve units for a limited group
of Fund members. The advocates of this idea thought that it
should be part of the solution because of the particular responsibili-
ties that some countries bore in the international monetary system.
When this view was advanced in July 1966, it was suggested that
the creation of this asset "should take place in close association with
the I.M.F.' 2 8 in contrast to the formula "in, or in close association
with, the Fund." It is not surprising that some technique other
than the amendment of the Articles would be thought appropriate
for a plan that was limited to less than the full membership of the
Fund. Once it was concluded that any plan should be unitary and
open to all Fund members, one argument in favor of some technique
other than amendment disappeared.
(8) A consideration that might have carried much weight in
favor of an affiliate involved the process by which decisions were to
be taken on the allocation or cancellation of special drawing rights.
One of the most remarkable phenomena since the Bretton Woods
Conference has been the growth in the economic and financial
strength of the Common Market powers. They have among them
approximately 16 percent of the total voting strength in the Fund as
compared with the approximately 22 percent of the United States.
The problem was to assure the Common Market that it would have
an appropriate voice in arriving at decisions. Most decisions of the
Fund are taken by a majority of votes cast, but a few are taken by
special majorities such as 75 or 80 percent of total voting power.
In order that the Common Market might have an influence com-
parable to that of the United States it was necessary to establish a
special majority that did not appear in the original Articles. Had a
problem of such sensitivity persisted it might have been easier to
resolve it within a new international organization. Ultimately, how-
27 Art. XXV, § 5.
2 8 
REPORT TO MINISTERS AND GOVERNORS [OF THE GROUP OF TEN] BY THE
GROUP OF DEPUTIES 5 99 (July 7, 1966).
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ever, it became possible to reach agreement on a special majority of
85 percent as part of a much broader compromise. Once again,
therefore, it became unnecessary to establish an affiliate in order to
achieve an objective that in the end members were willing to see
achieved through the Fund by the amendment of its Articles.
CONCLUSION
The amendment of a major international charter is a rare event,
and the agreed purpose for which the Articles of the Fund are being
amended represents an immense step forward in the development
of the international monetary system. The Proposed Amendment
emerged from labyrinthine debates, in which the last stage was the
74 sessions that the Executive Directors of the Fund devoted to the
review of 4 successive drafts. Even at this early date after the com-
pletion of the task it is becoming difficult to recall all of the reasons
why the legal technique that prevailed was adopted in preference to
others. It is submitted that the correct choice was made if only
because it was the simplest technique in a world in which inevitably
international organization becomes increasingly complex. The de-
fense of that submission must be the remark of Dr. Johnson who
once said that false modesty was the worst form of boasting because
it showed how much one felt one could afford to throw away.
1969]
